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Past Climate Variability and Change in the Arctic and at High Latitudes

Chapter 8 — Key Findings and Recommendations

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12 **8.1 INTRODUCTION**

13 Paleoclimatic data provide a highly informative if incomplete history of Arctic climate.
14 Temperature history is especially well recorded, and it commonly allows researchers to
15 accurately reconstruct changes and rates of changes for particular seasons. Precipitation (rain or
16 snow) and the extent of ice on land and sea are some of the many other climate variables that
17 have also been reconstructed. The data also provide insight to the histories of many possible
18 causes of the climate changes and feedback processes that amplify or reduce the resulting
19 changes. Comparing climate with possible causes allows scientists to generate and test
20 hypotheses, and those hypotheses then become the basis for projections of future changes.

21 Arctic data show changes on numerous time scales and indicate many causes and
22 important feedback processes. Changes in greenhouse gases appear to have been especially
23 important in causing climate changes [sections 3.4; 4.4.1; 4.4.4, 5.4.1; 5.4.2]. Global climate
24 changes have been notably amplified in the Arctic [section 4.5.2], and warmer times have
25 melted ice on land and sea [Chapter 7].¹

26

27 **8.2 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS**

28 **Chapter 4 Temperature and Precipitation**

¹ Statistically valid confidence levels often can be attached to scientific findings, but commonly require many independent samples from a large population. Such a standard can be applied to paleoclimatic data in only some cases, whereas in other cases the necessary archives or interpretative tools are not available. However, expert judgment can also be used to assess confidence. The key findings here cannot all be evaluated rigorously using parametric statistics, but on the basis of assessment by the authors, all of the key findings are at least “likely” as used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (more than 66% chance of being correct); the authors believe that the most of the findings are “very likely” (more than a 90% chance of being correct).

29 The Arctic of 65 million years ago (Ma) was much warmer than in recent decades;
30 forests grew in all land regions and neither perennial sea ice nor the Greenland Ice Sheet were
31 present. Gradual but bumpy cooling has dominated since, with the falling atmospheric CO₂
32 concentration apparently the most important contributor to the cooling, although with possible
33 additional contributions from changing continental positions and their effects on atmospheric or
34 oceanic circulation. Warm “bumps” during the general cooling trend include the relatively
35 abrupt Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum about 55 Ma, apparently caused by an increase in
36 greenhouse gas concentrations, and a more gradual warming in the middle Pliocene (about 3
37 Ma) of uncertain cause.

38 Around 2.7 Ma cooling reached the threshold for extensive development of continental
39 ice sheets throughout the North American and Eurasian Arctic. Periodic growth and shrinkage
40 of the ice over hundreds of thousands of years indicate strong control by periodic changes in
41 Northern Hemisphere sunshine caused by cyclic variations in Earth’s orbit. Recent work
42 suggests that, in the absence of human influence, the current interglacial would continue for a
43 few tens of thousands of years before the start of a new ice age. The large temperature
44 differences between glacial and interglacial periods, although driven by Earth’s orbital cycles
45 and the globally synchronous response, reflect the effects of strong positive feedbacks, such as
46 changes in atmospheric concentrations of CO₂ and other greenhouse gases and in the extent of
47 reflective snow and ice.

48 Interactions among the various orbital cycles have caused small differences between
49 successive interglacials. During the interglacial about 130–120 thousand years ago (ka), the
50 Arctic received more summer sunshine than in the current interglacial, and summer
51 temperatures in many places were consequently 4° to 6°C warmer than recently, which reduced

52 ice on Greenland (Chapter 6), raised sea level, and melted virtually all small glaciers and ice
53 caps.

54 The cooling into and warming out of the most recent glacial which peaked 20 ka were
55 punctuated by numerous abrupt climate changes, with millennial persistence of conditions
56 between jumps requiring years to decades. These events were very large around the North
57 Atlantic but much smaller elsewhere in the Arctic and beyond. Large changes in the extent of
58 sea ice in the North Atlantic were probably responsible, linked to changes in regional and
59 global patterns of ocean circulation. Freshening of the North Atlantic also favored formation of
60 sea ice.

61 Such abrupt changes also occurred in the current interglacial (the Holocene), but they
62 ended as the *Laurentide Ice Sheet* on Canada melted away. Arctic temperatures in the
63 Holocene broadly responded to orbital changes with warmer temperatures during the early to
64 middle Holocene when there was more summer sunshine. Warming generally led to northward
65 migration of vegetation and to shrinkage of ice on land and sea. Small oscillations in climate
66 during the Holocene, such as the Medieval Climate Anomaly and the Little Ice Age, were
67 linked to variations in the sun-blocking effect of particles from explosive volcanoes and
68 perhaps to small variations in solar output or in ocean circulation or other factors. The warming
69 from the Little Ice Age appears to have begun for largely natural reasons, but there is now high
70 scientific confidence that human contributions, and especially increasing concentrations of
71 CO₂, have come to dominate the warming (Jansen et al., 2007).

72 Comparison of summertime temperature anomalies for the Arctic and for lower
73 latitudes, averaged over at least millennia for key climatic intervals of the past, shows that
74 Arctic changes were threefold to fourfold larger than those in lower latitudes. This more

75 pronounced response applies to intervals that were both warmer and colder than in recent
76 decades. Arctic amplification of temperature changes thus appears to be a consistent feature of
77 the Earth system.

78

79 **Chapter 5 Rates of Change**

80 Changes in climate have many causes, occur at different rates, and are sustained for
81 different intervals. Changes in atmospheric composition, along with changes in atmospheric and
82 oceanic circulations linked to tectonic processes over tens of millions of years, have led to large
83 climate changes, including conditions so warm that the Arctic was ice-free in winter and so cold
84 that large Arctic regions remained ice-covered year-round. Features of Earth's orbit acting for
85 tens of thousands of years have rearranged sunshine on the planet and paced the growth and
86 shrinkage of great ice-age ice sheets. Anomalously cold single years have resulted from the
87 influence of large, explosive volcanoes, with slightly anomalous decades in response to the
88 random variations in the frequency of occurrence of such explosive volcanoes.

89 As observed in Greenland or more generally around the Arctic, the more-persistent of
90 these causes of climate change have produced larger climate changes, but at lower average
91 rates. When compared to this general trend, the regional effects around the North Atlantic of
92 abrupt climate changes linked to shifts in ocean circulation have been anomalously rapid;
93 however, the globally averaged temperature effects of those abrupt climate changes were not
94 anomalously large. And, relative to this general trend of larger climate changes occurring more
95 slowly, human-linked Arctic perturbations of the most recent decades do not appear
96 anomalously rapid or large, but model-projected changes summarized by the IPCC may become
97 anomalously large and rapid.

98 Interpretation of these observations is complicated by lack of a generally accepted way
99 of formally assessing the effects or importance of size versus rate versus persistence of climate
100 change. The report here relied much more heavily on ice-core data from *Greenland* than would
101 be ideal in assessing Arctic-wide changes. Existing techniques described in this report offer
102 substantial opportunities for generation and synthesis of additional data that could extend the
103 available results. If widely applied, such research could remove the over-reliance on Greenland
104 data.

105

106 **Chapter 6 The Greenland Ice Sheet**

107 Paleoclimate data show that the volume of the Greenland Ice Sheet has changed greatly
108 in the past, affecting global sea level. Physical understanding indicates that many environmental
109 factors can force changes in ice-sheet size. Comparing histories of important forcings with ice-
110 sheet size implicates cooling as causing ice-sheet growth, warming as causing shrinkage, and
111 sufficiently large warming as causing complete or almost complete loss. The evidence for
112 temperature control is clearest for temperatures similar to or warmer than those occurring in the
113 last few millennia. The available evidence shows that Greenland had less ice when snowfall was
114 higher, indicating that snowfall rate is not the leading control on ice-sheet size. Rising sea level
115 tends to float marginal regions of ice sheets and force their retreat, so the generally positive
116 relation between sea level and temperature means that, typically, both have pushed the ice sheet
117 in the same direction. However, for some small changes during the most recent millennia,
118 marginal fluctuations in the ice sheet have been opposed to those expected from local relative
119 sea-level forcing but in the direction expected from temperature forcing. This, plus the tendency
120 for shrinkage to pull ice-sheet margins out of the ocean, indicate that sea-level change has not

121 been the dominant forcing at least for temperatures similar to or greater than those of the last
122 few millennia.

123 Histories of ice-sheet volume in fine time detail are not available, but the limited
124 paleoclimatic data at least agree that short-term and long-term responses to temperature change
125 have been in the same direction. The best estimate from paleoclimatic data is thus that warming
126 shrinks the *Greenland Ice Sheet*, and warming of a few degrees is sufficient to cause ice-sheet
127 loss. Figure 6.13 shows a threshold for ice-sheet removal from sustained summertime warming
128 of 5°C, with a range of uncertainties from 2° to 7°C, but tightly constrained numerical estimates
129 are not available, nor are rigorous error bounds, and the available data poorly constrain the rate
130 of loss. Numerous opportunities exist for additional data collection and analyses that would
131 reduce the uncertainties.

132

133 **Chapter 7 Arctic Sea Ice**

134 Geological data indicate that the history of Arctic sea ice is closely linked with
135 temperature changes. Sea ice in the Arctic Ocean may have appeared in response to long-term
136 cooling as early as 46 Ma. Year-round sea ice in the Arctic possibly developed as early as 13–
137 14 Ma, before the opening of the Bering Strait at 5.5 Ma. Nevertheless, extended seasonally ice-
138 free periods probably occurred until about 2.5 Ma. They ended with a large increase in the
139 extent and duration of sea-ice cover that more or less coincided with the onset of extensive
140 glaciation on land (within the considerable dating uncertainties). Some data suggest that ice
141 reductions marked subsequent interglacials and that the Arctic Ocean may have been seasonally
142 ice-free during the warmest events. For example, reduced-ice conditions are inferred for the last
143 interglacial and the onset of the current interglacial, about 130 and 10 ka .

144 Limited data suggest poorly understood variability in ice circulation for centuries to
145 millennia, but without strong periodic behavior on these time scales. Historical observations
146 indicate that ice cover in the Arctic began to diminish in the late 19th century, and that this
147 shrinkage has accelerated during the last several decades. Shrinkages that were both similarly
148 large and rapid have not been documented over at least the last few thousand years, although the
149 paleoclimatic record is sufficiently sparse that similar events might have been missed. Orbital
150 changes have made ice melting less likely than during the previous millennia since the end of
151 the last ice age, making the recent changes especially anomalous. Improved reconstructions of
152 sea-ice history would help clarify just how anomalous these recent changes are.

153

154 **8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS**

155 Paleoclimatic data on the Arctic are generated by numerous international investigators
156 who study a great range of archives throughout the vast reaches of the Arctic. The value of this
157 diversity is evident in this report. Many of the key results of this report rest especially on the
158 outcomes of community-based syntheses, such as the CAPE Project, and on multiply replicated
159 and heavily sampled archives, such as the central Greenland deep ice cores. Results from the
160 ACEX deep coring in Arctic Ocean sediments were appearing as this report was being written;
161 these results were quite valuable and will become more so with synthesis and replication,
162 including comparison with land-based as well as marine records. The number of questions
163 answered, and raised, by this one new data set shows how sparse the data are on many aspects
164 of Arctic paleoclimate change. *Future research should maintain and expand the diversity of*
165 *investigators, techniques, archives, and geographic locations, while promoting development*
166 *of community-based syntheses and multiply-replicated, heavily-sampled archives; only*

167 *through breadth and depth can the remaining uncertainties be reduced while confidence in*
168 *the results is improved.*

169

170 The questions asked of this study by the CCSP are relevant to public policy and require
171 answers. The answers provided here are, we hope, useful and informative. However, we
172 recognize that despite the contributions of numerous community members to this report, in
173 many cases a basis was not available in the refereed scientific literature to provide answers with
174 the accuracy and precision desired by policymakers. *Future research activities in Arctic*
175 *paleoclimate should address in greater detail the policy-relevant questions that motivated this*
176 *report.*

177

178 Paleoclimatic data provide very clear evidence of past changes in important aspects of
179 the Arctic climate system. The ice of the Greenland Ice Sheet, smaller glaciers and ice caps, the
180 Arctic Ocean, and soils are shown to be vulnerable to warming, and Arctic ecosystems are
181 strongly affected by changing ice and climate. National and international studies generally
182 project rapid warming in the future. If this warming occurs, the paleoclimatic data indicate that
183 melting of ice and associated effects will follow, with implications for ecosystems and
184 economies. *The results presented here should be utilized in the design of monitoring, process,*
185 *and model-projection studies of Arctic change and linked global responses.*

186

187 **Highlights of Key Findings**

- 188 • Arctic temperature changes have been larger than correlative globally
189 averaged changes, by approximately threefold in both warmer and colder times, in
190 response to processes still active in the Arctic.
- 191 • Arctic temperatures have changed greatly but slowly in response to long-
192 lasting causes and by lesser amounts but more rapidly in response to other causes.
193 Human-forced changes of the most recent decades do not appear notably anomalous in
194 rate or size for their duration when they are compared with the fastest of these natural
195 changes, but projections for future human-caused changes include the possibility of
196 anomalously large and rapid changes.
- 197 • The *Greenland Ice Sheet* has consistently grown with cooling and shrunk
198 with warming, and a warming of a few degrees (about 5°C, with uncertainties between
199 about 2° and 7°C) or more has been sufficient to completely or almost completely
200 remove the ice sheet if maintained long enough; the rate of that removal is poorly
201 known. Reduction in the size of the *Greenland Ice Sheet* in the past has resulted in a
202 corresponding rise in sea level.
- 203 • Warming has decreased sea ice, which in turn strongly magnifies
204 warming, and seasonally ice-free conditions and even year-round ice-free conditions
205 have occurred in response to sufficiently large but poorly quantified forcing.
- 206 • Although major climate changes have typically affected the whole Arctic,
207 important regional differences have been common; a full understanding of Arctic
208 climatology and paleoclimatology requires regionally-resolved studies.
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